The EU's Defence Plan: Ambition on Paper, Dependence in Practice

Executive Summary

Europe’s defence ambition is growing — but its capacity still lags. In “The EU Defence Industrial Strategy: The ‘Colbertist Revolution’ Will Have to Wait,” we analyse how the EU’s first-ever defence industrial plan grants the European Commission a formal role in defence production without giving it the means to act. Russia’s war on Ukraine has exposed Europe’s reliance on U.S. capabilities and a fragmented industrial base. On 5 March 2024, the European Commission and EEAS presented the first-ever EU Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). Their goal is to boost production, cooperation, and reduce foreign dependence. But despite clear political objectives, EDIS remains evolutionary rather than revolutionary: interventionist instruments lack financial resources and political incentives, and intergovernmental control still dominates— it falls short of a “Colbertist revolution.”

EDIS is a step forward — but mostly symbolic. For the first time, the Commission claims a strategic role in defence production. EDIS sets priorities, outlines instruments, and introduces planning language. Yet the €1.5 billion budget for 2025–27 remains modest, its planning is indicative, and its priorities non-binding. Crucially, it does not constrain national procurement choices or mandate joint acquisitions.

Europe’s defence industry remains fragmented and dependent. Defence procurement is still overwhelmingly national — only 18% of spending is collaborative, and just 11% involves EU suppliers. Since 2022, almost 80% of weapons purchased by EU states came from outside Europe, 63% from the US. Despite decades of integration talk, member states continue to buy nationally or off-the-shelf abroad.

Defence industrial policy is harder than green or digital policy. The EU has successfully built supranational tools in climate and digital. In defence, however, sovereignty and security concerns prevent centralisation. EDIS reflects this tension: a hybrid model with a supranational façade but intergovernmental substance. It places the Commission in the role of political broker, not entrepreneur, avoiding conflict with large states and prime contractors.

Key arguments

1. EDIS institutionalises a Commission role without disrupting member-state control. It signals supranational involvement, but national prerogatives still dominate capability development and procurement.

2. EDIS is strategic in form but weak in substance. Its budget (€1.5 bn for 2025–27) is far below what is needed, its priorities are non-binding, and procurement choices remain national.

3. Europe’s defence base remains fractured and dependent. Voluntary coordination cannot deliver a sovereign defence industry. Moving beyond regulatory coordination will require centralised planning, binding procurement rules, and significantly greater financial resources.

The key question is whether Europe can move beyond voluntary coordination. Until member states are willing to pool procurement and match ambition with resources, the “Colbertist revolution” in EU defence industrial policy will have to wait.